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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On May 29, 2007, Mr. Ochieng filed a Motion for Obtaining an Order Modifying the
Original Conviction and Sentence and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. The district court
treated the motion to modify the conviction and sentence as both a motion to reduce his
I

I sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, and a petition for post-conviction relief brought
:

!

pursuant to the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Action, § 19-4901 ef seq. In a single
order, the district court denied the Motion for Appointment of Counsel and held the motion to

I

j

: modify the conviction and sentence as untimely under both avenues of relief.

j
i

On appeal, Mr. Ochieng contends, in part, that the district court erred in failing to rule on
his motion for appointment of counsel prior to summarily dismissing his petition. This Reply

i

I

Brief is filed to clarify the proper standard for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction

!

i
I

1 ,
I

action and its proper application in this case.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas

I

The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
I

articulated in Mr. Ochieng's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
I

Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUE
Has the State incorrectly asserted that Mr. Ochieng's motion for the appointment of
counsel was properly denied because on the face of the petition, the petition appeared
"time-barred" and was thus "frivolous" pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-852?

1
1

I

ARGUMENT
Because ldaho Code Section 19-852 Does Not Applv In Post-Conviction Proceedinqs,
And Because A Petitioner Is Not Required To Anticipate Possible Affirmative Defenses
And Neaate Them Even Before The Affirmative Defense Has Been Pleaded. The State
Is Incorrect In Its Assertions That Mr. Ochiena's Motion For The Appointment Of
Counsel Was Properlv Dismissed Because The Petition Appeared Frivolous
A.

Introduction
In the Respondent's Brief, the State has relied upon ldaho Code section 19-852's

frivolousness standard and cases applying that standard to assert that the district court
properly denied Mr. Ochieng's Motion for the Appointment of Counsel. However, the
ldaho Supreme Court has recognized that section 19-852 does not apply to postconviction proceedings. In addition, the State asks this Court to find that a district court
need not appoint counsel to pro se petitioners when, on the face of the petition, the
petition appears to have been filed outside of the time limitations articulated in I.C. § 194902. Because meeting the time limit articulated in I.C. § 19-4902 is not an element of
a claim for post-conviction relief, but rather is a response to the State's affirmative
defense that the claim is time barred, it is not necessary for a post-conviction petitioner
to include allegations about tolling in the petition. Thus, counsel should not be denied
for failure to plead such facts. Finally, when the proper standard for the appointment of
counsel in post-conviction actions is applied to the facts of this case, it is apparent that
the district court erred in denying Mr. Ochieng's Motion for the Appointment of Counsel.

B.

Because ldaho Code Section 19-852 Does Not Applv In Post-Conviction
Proceedings, And Because A Petitioner Is Not Reauired To Anticipate Possible
Affirmative Defenses And Negate Them Even Before The Affirmative Defense
Has Been Pleaded, The State Is Incorrect In Its Assertions That Mr. Ochieng's
Motion For The Amointment Of Counsel Was Properlv Dismissed Because The
Petition Was Frivolous
In addition to the substantive ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in

his Motion For Obtaining An Order Modifying The Original Conviction and Sentence,
Mr. Ochieng informed the district court that following sentencing he was "whisked to an
INS holding facility," and subject to "continued detention by INS." (R., p.62.) He further
explained that English was not his first language.

(R., p.64.) In his Motion For

Appointment of Counsel, Mr. Ochieng informed the court that he had no legal
background, that he had been "locked up for a long time as a result of this case," and
that he could not afford private counsel. (R., p.70.) Finally, in his Motion for Notice of
Hearing, Mr. Ochieng asked for a "writ requiring, the Denver field District Director
Department of Homeland Security to release the defendant from its custody to the
custody of the State of ldaho for the said hearing." (R., p.77.) Thus, at the time the
district court denied Mr. Ochieng's motion to appoint counsel it knew that Mr. Ochieng
was asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, was in the custody of the federal
government, was being housed in Denver, Colorado, was not a native English speaker,
and had no legal training or experience.
1.

The State Has lncorrectlv Relied Upon The Frivolousness Standard
Because ldaho Code Section 19-852 Does Not A p ~ l vIn Post-Conviction
Proceedinas

Relying, upon ldaho Code § 19-852 and cases decided pursuant to that statute,
the State has asserted on appeal that the district court properly denied Mr. Ochieng's

Motion for Appointment of Counsel because his petition for post conviction relief
appeared time-barred, and was thus frivolous. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) As is
discussed below, the State has relied upon an outdated legal analysis and has
incorrectly focused upon the ultimate merits of the petition, as opposed to the proper
question of whether there is the possibility of a valid claim such that fhe claim should be
investigated by counsel. Furthermore, when the proper legal analysis is applied, it is
apparent that the district court committed reversible error when it denied Mr. Ochieng's
motion for the appointment of counsel.
As the ldaho Supreme Court recognized in 2003 and again in 2007, "'I.C. § 19852 no longer applies in post-conviction cases and appointment of counsel in those
cases is governed only by I.C. 3 19-4904."' Swader v. State, 143 ldaho 651,653, 152
P.23d 12, 14 (2007) (quoting Quinlan v. ldaho Comm'n for Pardons and Parole, 138
ldaho 726, 730, 69 P.3d 146, 150 (2003).
frivolousness standard articulated in I.C.

Thus, the State's reliance upon the

3 19-852 is misplaced.

The proper legal standard for appointment of counsel does not focus on whether
the petitioner will ultimately prevail on his claims, bur rather addresses whether there is
the possibility of a valid claim such that the claim should be investigafed by counsel.
See Swader, 143 ldaho at 655, 152 P.3d at 16. Although the "investigation by counsel
may not produce evidence sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss," this is not
controlling as "the decision to appoint counsel and the decision on the merits of the
petition if counsel is appointed are controlled by two different standards." Id. Thus, the
State's application of a frivolousness standard has incorrectly focused on the ultimate
merits of Mr. Ochieng's petition, as opposed to the need for investigation of his claims.

2.

Because A Petitioner Is Not Reauired To Anticipate Possible Affirmative
Defenses And Nenate Them Even Before The Affirmative Defense Has
Been Pleaded. The State Is Incorrect in Its Assertions That Mr. Ochienq's
Motion For The Appointment Of Counsel Was Properlv Dismissed
Because The Petition Appeared Frivolous

In claiming that Mr. Ocheing's petition was "frivolous," the State's focus on the
alleged violation of the statute of limitations has incorrectly placed the proverbial cart
before the horse. The State asks this Court to hold that a petitioner can be denied
counsel and the post-conviction action dismissed if, based upon the face of the petition,
the petition appears "time-barred."

(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.)

However, an

assertion of facts supporting a claim of toiling of the statute of limitations "is not an
element of a claim for post-conviction relief; it is a response to the State's affirmative
defense that the claim is time barred." Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 792, 992 P.2d
783, 787 (1999). Thus, it is not necessary for a post-conviction petitioner to include
allegations about tolling in the petition. Id. "To hold otherwise would require inmates,
who are untrained in the law and are generally acting without the benefit of counsel in
the preparation of their applications, to anticipate possible affirmative defenses and
negate them even before the affirmative defense has been pleaded." Id.
Because a petitioner need not anticipate the affirmative defenses that may or
may not be asserted in his case and, thus, need not negate the affirmative defense of a
violation of the statute of limitation in the initial petition, a petitioner should not be denied
counsel and his petition dismissed for failure to do these things.

Demanding such

action on the part of a pro se petitioner would require him not only to anticipate possible
defenses, but also to know what the essential elements of a tolling claim are. Idaho's
appellate courts have recognized that this is an unreasonable burden to place on pro se

petitioners. Anderson, 133 ldaho at 792, 992 P.2d at 787; Charboneau v. State, 140
ldaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). Thus, the denial of counsel and a
dismissal based upon a finding that the petition appears to be "time-barred" is
premature and reversible error
3.

Application Of The Lenal Analysis Applicable To Requests For The
Appointment Of Counsel Shows That The District Court Committed
Reversible Error When It Failed To Appoint Counsel For Mr. Ochienq

In the present case, the application of the legal analysis applicable to requests
for the appointment of counsel shows that the district court committed reversible error
when it failed to appoint counsel for Mr. Ochieng. As the ldaho Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized, when considering whether to appoint counsel in a postconviction case,
the trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a
pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete. Although facts
sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist,
they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does
not know what are the essential elements of a claim.
Charboneau, 140 ldaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111; see also Swader, 143 ldaho at 653,
152 P.3d at 15 (stating "In Brown v. Sfate, 135 ldaho 676, 23 P.3d 138 (2001), we noted
that a pro se petitioner may fail to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for postI

conviction relief simply because he or she does not know the essential elements of the

I

claim."). In addition, the trial courts must consider "whether circumstances prevent the
petitioner from making a more thorough investigation into the facts," such as when the

i
1

i

petitioner is incarcerated, and whether presentation of a claim will "require the
assistance of someone trained in the law," such as when a petitioner must show "that
his or her counsel's performance was deficient or that such deficiency prejudiced the

I

defense." Swader, 143 ldaho at 655, 152 P.3d at 16.

Thus, "the trial court should

appoint counsel if the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to
conduct a further investigation into the claim." Swader, 143 ldaho at 655, 152 P.3d at
16 (emphasis added).
Mr. Ochieng alleged facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a
further investigation into his claims. Mr. Ochieng's specific claims, and argument in
support of this assertion can be found in the Appellant's Brief at pp.4-6, 21-24, which is
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

In addition, it should be noted that

Mr. Ochieng raised a number of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. These claims
"require the assistance of someone trained in the law," as Mr. Ochieng must show "that
his or her counsel's performance was deficient [and] that such deficiency prejudiced the
defense." Swader, 143 ldaho at 655, 152 P.3d at 16.
Finally, even if Mr. Ochieng was required to anticipate the Court or State's
assertion of the affirmative defense of violation of the statute of limitations, Mr. Ochieng
alleged sufficient facts to raise the possibility of a valid tolling argument. Although
Mr. Ochieng's petition was filed outside of the time limitations articulated in I.C. § 194902, even the State has acknowledged that this time limitation can be tolled under
certain circumstances. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.8.) For example, the constitutional
right of access to the courts is violated "when a prisoner is housed in an out-of-state
facility without either legal reference materials of the state of conviction or reasonable
alternative means of access...." Martinez v. State, 130 ldaho 530, 536, 944 P.2d 127,

133 (Ct. App. 1997). In his various pleadings, Mr. Ocheing alleged that following
I

sentencing he was "whisked to an INS holding facility," and subject to "continued
detention by INS," (R., p.62) and that he was being held in Denver, Colorado (R., p.77).
He further explained that English was not his first language. (R., p.64.) In his Motion

I
I

For Appointment of Counsel, Mr. Ochieng informed the court that he had no legal
background, that he had been "locked up for a long time as a result of this case," and
that he could not afford private counsel. (R., p.70.) Thus, at the time the district court

I
I

i

denied Mr. Ochieng's motion to appoint counsel it knew that Mr Ochieng was asserting
ineffective assistance of counsel, was in the custody of the federal government, was
being housed in Denver, Colorado, was not a native Engl~shspeaker, and had no legal

I
I

1

1

training or experience. These facts are sufficient to raise the possibility of a valid toiling
claim "such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain
counsel to conduct a further investigation info the claim." Swader, 143 Idaho at 655,
152 P.3d at 16 (emphasis added).

i

CONCLUSION

I

Mr. Ochieng respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, and remand this case to the district

I

court with an order that the motion to modify the conviction and sentence be properly treated
as a post-conviction petition, and that counsel be appointed to represent Mr. Ochieng.

'

DATED this Ilth
day of February, 2009.
#

Chief, Appellate Unit

1

i

I
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